Self-Determination in Hong Kong: A New Challenge to an Old Doctrine by Amberg, Eric M.
San Diego Law Review 
Volume 22 
Issue 4 Law of the Sea XVII Article 8 
7-1-1985 
Self-Determination in Hong Kong: A New Challenge to an Old 
Doctrine 
Eric M. Amberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr 
 Part of the Law of the Sea Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eric M. Amberg, Self-Determination in Hong Kong: A New Challenge to an Old Doctrine, 22 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 839 (1985). 
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol22/iss4/8 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, 
please contact digital@sandiego.edu. 
Comments
SELF-DETERMINATION IN HONG KONG: A NEW
CHALLENGE TO AN OLD DOCTRINE
The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong, long known for its sta-
tus as a major Pacific Basin financial center, will become a "spe-
cial administrative region" of the People's Republic of China(PRC) in 1997. Great Britain and the PRC have negotiated an
agreement designed not only to transfer sovereignty over the col-
ony to the PRC but also to allow the PRC to modernize its econ-
omy by preserving a capitalist enclave within the communist state.
The maintenance of the economic stature of the colony and the
success of this grand experiment is largely dependent upon the de-
gree of confidence with which the people of Hong Kong view the
agreement. This Comment argues that the right of self-determina-
tion should be invoked on behalf of the people of Hong Kong to
allow them to make a free and informed choice for the future.
INTRODUCTION
"What is freedom? Freedom is the right to choose: the right to
create for yourself the alternatives of choice. Without the possibility
of choice and the exercise of choice a man is not a man but a mem-
ber, an instrument, a thing."'
In September 1984 our representatives of the governments of
Great Britain and the People's Republic of China (PRC) concluded
negotiations regarding the transfer of sovereignty over the 5.5 mil-
lion inhabitants of Hong Kong when a lease covering most of the
colony expires in 1997.2 The draft agreement resulting from the ne-
gotiations is expected to be ratified in treaty form during the sum-
1. A. MACLEISH in PETER'S QUOTATIONS 208 (1977).
2. The ninety-nine year lease, obtained by Great Britain under the terms of the
1898 Convention of Peking, applies only to the New Territories located on the Chinese
mainland north of the Kowloon Peninsula. Tso, The Legal Implications of the Sing-
British Treaties Regarding Hong Kong, 4 Lo. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 111, 113 (1981).
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mer of 1985. There are many political, economic, and social
problems to be resolved during the interim twelve-year period before
the transfer occurs. One of the most pressing questions, however, is
the extent to which the people of Hong Kong will have a say in their
future.
The British and Communist Chinese have determined the future
political status of the colony and the rights of its inhabitants without
Hong Kong's active participation. The conduct of the negotiations
and the agreement itself may thus be inconsistent with an estab-
lished practice in international law. Professor Louis Heniin has
identified what he calls "the classic case of self-determination -
namely, the international recognition of the rights of the inhabitants
of a colony to choose freely their independence or association with
another state."'4 The right of the people of Hong Kong to exercise
self-determination has been largely ignored in international circles,
and indeed, even in the United Nations, the birthplace of the
principle.5
Nearly a quarter of a century ago, the UN forged a doctrine
which is the foundation of existence for many of the states of the
Third World today. Calling for a "speedy and unconditional end [to]
colonialism in all its forms and manisfestations, ' '6 the UN developed
the principle of the right of self-determination to take into account
the freely expressed wishes of the people of a territory seeking self-
government.7 As an imperative and immediate goal for all peoples
under colonial or alien domination, 8 self-determination was widely
used by the Third World bloc to counter "economic imperialism."
Seeking to secure permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth
and resources in a new international economic order, 10 the Third
World countries emphasized self-determination, anti-colonialism,
3. See generally A Draft Agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's
Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong, Sept. 26, 1984 [hereinafter referred to
as Hong Kong White Paper].
4. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 211 (1980) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as L. HENKIN].
5. Telephone interview with Mr. Jack Hand, Hong Kong Commission, British
Embassy, New York (July 26, 1984).
6. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
ples, G.A. Res. 1514(XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doe. A/4684
(1960).
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 76, para. b.
8. M. POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE: THE NEW
DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 10 (1982).
9. Henkin, Politics and the Changing Law of the Sea, 89 POL. ScI. Q. 46, 51-52
(1974), reprinted in L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 32.
10. See generally UN Declaration on the Establishment of a New International
Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, (Sixth Spec. Sess.) 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at
3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
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sovereign equality, non-intervention, and the invalidity of unequal
treaties in their international affairs."' These new states, with the
authority to make and to change law in the international political
system,12 have made self-determination "the preemptory norm of in-
ternational law." 13 As new states carved out of old colonial regimes
were admitted to the UN, adherence to the principle increased. The
principle had a sort of "snowball" effect; as self-determination be-
came more a part of the fabric of international law, other political
units within colonial areas sought to exercise the right. These newly
"self-determined" states aligned themselves with the growing Third
World bloc.1 4 No longer the new doctrine of the United Nations,15
the principle of self-determination is capable of overriding any other
preemptory norm of international law, including the prohibition of
the threat or use of force in international relations.16 Within this his-
torical context, the principle occupies a position of great importance
in UN discussion.
The importance of the self-determination principle to the Third
World has not been lost on the PRC, which has sought to emerge as
the champion of the lesser-developed countries." Newly admitted to
the UN, the PRC apparently accepts the right of self-determination
in principle. 18 Its refusal to accept an independent Taiwan, however,
indicates a tendency to manipulate the principle without much re-
gard for consistency or reciprocity. 9 Some commentators believe
that the PRC intends the Hong Kong "one country, two systems
concept" to serve as a model for Taiwan and Portuguese owned Ma-
cao so as to soften its attempt to reunify China."'
Although both the Peking and London governments have given as-
surances that the unique economic system and way of life of Hong
Kong will be preserved,21 the juxtaposition of different political sys-
tems will undoubtedly require some adjustments in the economic sys-
tem of Hong Kong. It is not surprising that much of the population
11. Lissitzyn, International Law Today and Tomorrow, (1965), reprinted in L.
HENKIN supra note 3, at 31.
12. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 32.
13. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 1 (emphasis in original).
14. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 32.
15. See generally M. POMERANCE, supra note 8.
16. Id. at 1.
17. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 32.
18. Id.
19. Lissitzyn, supra note 11, at 31.
20. The Washington Times, June 15, 1984, at 7A, col. 2.
21. Hong Kong White Paper, supra note 3, at 8, 12.
of Hong Kong remains skeptical of PRC assurances that the colony
will be allowed to freely continue its economic pursuits. 22 Ninety-
eight percent of the population of Hong Kong is Chinese; many have
immigrated from mainland China.23 According to British govern-
ment figures, approximately three-quarters of a million people,
mainly from the commercial centers of Kwangtung province and
Shanghai, left China and fled to Hong Kong when the communists
came to power.24 Although there is no accurate estimate of how
many Chinese will leave the colony before 1997, many of the eco-
nomically-minded citizens of Hong Kong are certain that a heavy-
handed bureaucracy from the mainland will stifle the colony's "free-
wheeling" economy.25
Hong Kong presents an opportunity for the world community to
review the self-determination principle from a fresh perspective. This
Comment will briefly discuss the origins of the right of self-determi-
nation, trace its development as a norm of international law, and
analyze the current UN practice of the right.26 Specifically, the prin-
ciple will be applied to the transfer of sovereignty of Hong Kong in
light of the special circumstances of that territory and its people.
Without the right of self-determination, the people of Hong Kong
have two choices: (1) remain in the territory and become citizens of
the PRC; or (2) exercise the private equivalent of seces-
sion-emigration.2 7 If they can successfully claim the right of self-
determination, Hong Kong citizens will have "the right of every peo-
ple to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live, to be free
of alien masters, and not to be handed about from sovereignty to
sovereignty as if they were property." 28
RELEVANT HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN CLAIMS TO HONG KONG
The Crown Colony of Hong Kong consists of Hong Kong Island,
British Kowloon, Stonecutters Island, and the New Territories. Brit-
ish sovereignty over the colony began after the defeat of Chinese
forces in the Opium War. Hong Kong Island, at the time little more
than a barren rock, was formally occupied by a British Naval party
on January 26, 1841, and was proclaimed a British colony a few
22. L.A. Times, Aug. 16, 1984, part I-B, at 6, col. 1.
23. Tso, supra note 2, at 128-29.
24. Fact sheet prepared by British Information Services, Oct. 1976, at 4. [herein-
after cited as Fact sheet].
25. Tso, supra note 2, at 134-35.
26. See generally M. POMERANCE, supra note 8 (Professor Pomerance thoroughly
reviews the history of self-determination and its development as a norm of international
law. It is recommended for any serious study of the principle.).
27. Id. at 27 n.151.
28. 3 THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON (R. Baker & W. Dodds eds.
1927) cited in M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 1.
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days later.2 9 The 1842 treaty of Nanking ceded the island to Britain
in perpetuity,30 and declared Hong Kong a free port.31
Great Britain acquired control over Stonecutters Island and the
Kowloon Peninsula at the 1860 Convention of Peking.32 The colony
was further enlarged in 1898 by another Convention of Peking
whereby Great Britain obtained a ninety-nine year lease for the New
Territories.33 The lease increased the size of the colony from 43 to
400 square miles-an action perceived by the British as necessary to
protect the colony. 4 In 1997, when the lease expires, Great Britain
will relinquish sovereignty over the New Territories as well as those
areas held in perpetuity.3 5
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the Chinese have
consistently asserted that Hong Kong is Chinese territory, and issues
regarding Hong Kong and Macao are not subject to UN scrutiny
but, rather, are entirely within the sovereign authority of the PRC. 6
The PRC's objections to China as a continued foreign presence in
Hong Kong and Macao are regarded by some commentators as
merely a preemptive effort "designed to abort any future claims by
the inhabitants . . . to separate selfhood."'37
The Chinese view the treaties with Great Britain as unequal and
imposed by duress during a period of weakness and thus unenforce-
able.38 However, while reserving the right to adopt its own solution if
agreement is not reached,39 the PRC has negotiated the transfer and
sovereignty on the basis of those treaties as a source of international
law in accordance with Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice.40
29. Fact sheet, supra note 24, at 4.
30. Under Article III of the Treaty of Nanking, the Island of Hong Kong was
ceded to Britain "to be possessed in perpetuity by her Britain-nick Majesty, her Heirs
and Successors .. " Tso, supra note 2, at 112.
31. Fact sheet, supra note 24, at 4.
32. Tso, supra note 2, at 113.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Wall St. J., June 22, 1984, at 1, col. 1. This decision has never really been in
doubt as both the British and Chinese understand that the Island of Hong Kong could
not remain under British control without the New Territories to support it. See Hong
Kong White Paper, supra note 3, at 8.
36. J. COHEN & H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DoCu-
MENTARY STUDY 383-84 (1974), cited in Tso, supra note 2, at 115-16.
37. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 27.
38. Tso, supra note 2, at 118.
39. The Times (London), Feb. 23, 1984, at 9, col. 5. See Hong Kong White Pa-
per, supra note 3, at 7.
40. See generally Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055,
In March 1984, the appointed legislative council of Hong Kong
(LEGCO) claimed the right to debate any proposals regarding the
future of the colony.41 Recently, the British government has set up
the Macpherson assessment office in Hong Kong to solicit comments
from the residents. 42 Apparently, Great Britain is willing to let Hong
Kong have a say in its own future but only to the extent that Hong
Kong can approve or reject the whole agreement. 43 If it is apparent,
through whatever indicia available, that Hong Kong will not accept
the agreement as proposed, the British Parliament will not ratify
that agreement.44 The leader of the PRC, Deng Xiaoping, met with
members of Hong Kong's appointed executive council (EXCO) but
refused to allow any Hong Kong representative, other than the Brit-
ish-born governor, to actively participate in the negotiations.45
Hence, the people of Hong Kong have not had any real impact upon
the agreement. If the agreement is not ratified by the British Parlia-
ment, Hong Kong may be forced to comply with essentially the
terms dictated by the PRC.46
The lack of a representative government in Hong Kong presents a
major obstacle in determining a consensus of the people regarding
the agreement. The present government, apart from British authori-
ties, is largely appointive. The Unofficial Members of the Executive
and Legislative Councils (UMELCO) is the highest consultative
body of the Hong Kong government.47 Its members are appointed by
the governor under the authority vested in him by Letters Patent and
Royal Instructions.48 The purpose of UMELCO is to provide a chan-
nel of communication by which the people of Hong Kong can ex-
press their views to the British authorities.49
In attempting to convey the concerns of the Hong Kong people to
both the Peking and London governments, UMELCO has been dis-
credited by members of the British parliament as being "unrepre-
sentative." 50 This position is ironic, considering that this undemo-
T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179 (1945).
41, The Times (London), Mar. 17, 1984, at 4, col. 7.
42. Telephone interview with Mr. Jack Hand, Hong Kong Commission, British
Embassy, New York (July 24, 1984). The British government has set up an assessment
office in Hong Kong under the direction of Mr. Ian Macpherson. The office will begin to
function after the draft 1997 agreement is published. See Hong Kong White Paper,
supra note 3, at 8-9.
43. Hong Kong White Paper, supra note 3, at 7-9.
44. Telephone interview with Mr. Jack Hand, Hong Kong Commission, British
Embassy, New York (July 24, 1984).
45. Id.
46. Hong Kong White Paper, supra note 3, at 7.
47. South China Morning Post, July 25, 1984, at 2, col. 4.
48. Letters Patent and Royal Instructions were commonly issued to administra-
tive authorities in the British Commonwealths to delineate their powers.
49. Fact sheet, supra note 24, at 5.
50. South China Morning Post, July 25, 1984, at 2, col. 4.
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cratic form of government was imposed upon Hong Kong by Great
Britain. Nevertheless, the people of Hong Kong should determine
whether or not UMELCO represents their views. The crucial issue is
how the acceptability of the agreement will be tested.
Reforms advocating indirect elections to LEGCO have been pro-
posed by members of the Hong Kong community in order to secure a
more representative government."1 The "Green Paper"5 2 currently
being discussed in LEGCO acknowledges the need to "firmly estab-
lish the root of the authority of the Government in the community
despite the change in Hong Kong's sovereignty." 53 It proposes grad-
ual introduction of direct elections with a review of the process to be
conducted in 1989. 5" The objective of the paper is to provide an au-
thoritative channel for the expression of the views of the people of
Hong Kong.55
From the foregoing, it appears that the people of Hong Kong are
laying the groundwork for a claim to self-determination. One of the
major tenets of self-determination is that integration into another
state should be the result of the "freely expressed wishes of the terri-
tory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their sta-
tus, their wishes having been expressed through informed and demo-
cratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult
suffrage."5 " Peking is displeased with these developments because a
more representative government, with direct elections, may not be in
accord with China's own plans for the administration of the region.5 7
Official disapproval of the "Greeii Paper", however, would in all
likelihood generate charges of meddling in Hong Kong affairs even
before 1997. The PRC has therefore declared that the document is a
matter for the British to resolve. Thus, it has tacitly reserved the
right to disagree in the future. 8
The PRC has concerned itself with implementation of the transfer
of sovereignty, seeking a smooth transitional period prior to 1997.
Having determined the basic structure of administration of Hong
Kong, the PRC has attempted to gain the confidence of the people of
51. Id. at 9, col. 4.
52. A "Green Paper" is a preliminary document circulated in the British govern-
ment on a particular subject. Upon passage by the British Parliament, a "White Paper"
formalizing the proposal is issued.
53. South China Morning Post, July 26, 1984, at 9, col. 4.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 10-11.
57. South China Morning Post, July 26, 1984, at 9, col. 1.
58. id.
the territory by illuminating, in as much detail as it deems neces-
sary, the provisions of the Hong Kong agreement.
THE DETAILS OF THE AGREEMENT
Great Britain and the PRC have agreed upon an arrangement that
will preserve Hong Kong's unique economic system and way of life
for fifty years after 1997.11 The agreement and all its annexes will be
legally binding and "prescribed with sufficient clarity and precision
to command the confidence of the people who live, work, trade and
invest" in Hong Kong.60
Hong Kong will be governed as a "special administrative region"
of the PRC, allowing the capitalist enclave a "high degree of auton-
omy." '61 The PRC has previously indicated that the economic and
social systems will remain basically unchanged, except for those
"laws which are colonialist or diminish China's sovereignty. 61 2
Specifically, the agreement will provide for the preservation of
Hong Kong's legal system and the body of laws in force, including
common law rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation, and
customary law. The power to make laws will continue to lie with the
legislative authorities of Hong Kong. 63 Judicial power, including the
final right of appeal, will remain in the courts of Hong Kong.64 Es-
sentially, the agreement guarantees that Hong Kong will be gov-
erned by Hong Kong people.6 5
Furthermore, Hong Kong will be able to continue to operate as a
separate customs territory; to continue to participate in international
organizations and trade agreements, such as the General Agreement
of Tariffs and Trade (GATT); and to continue to enjoy its own ex-
port quotas and tariff preferences. In short, Hong Kong will retain
its status as a free port and a major manufacturing and trading
economy.66
Most importantly, Hong Kong will manage its own financial af-
fairs and retain its revenues for its own purposes.67 Although it is
unclear how the PRC will integrate capitalist methods into its own
economy, Hong Kong will continue to serve as an important outlet
for Chinese goods. The juxtaposition of these seemingly incompatible
systems should prove to be an extremely interesting aspect of the
agreement to economists.
59. Hong Kong White Paper, supra note 3, at 8.
60. South China Morning Post, Aug. 2, 1984 at 8, col. 1.
61. Hong Kong White Paper, supra note 3, at 11.
62. The Times (London), Jan. 17, 1984, at 28, col. 1.
63. Hong Kong White Paper, supra note 3, at 15.
64. Id. at 15-16.
65. L.A. Times, Aug. 2, 1984, part I, at 16, col. 1.
66. Hong Kong White Paper, supra note 3, at 12.
67. Id. at 12, 17.
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The personal rights of the residents of Hong Kong will be pro-
tected; they will continue to enjoy the right to travel and to move
freely into and out of Hong Kong. The various educational programs
of Hong Kong will be preserved, as will the present freedom of
choice of education, including the ability to pursue an education
overseas.68 In sum, the agreement theoretically will "provide for the
preservation of all rights and freedoms which the people of Hong
Kong now enjoy. ' '69
The manner in which foreign policy and defense functions of
Hong Kong will be conducted is of major concern to its citizens. The
agreement provides that Chinese communist troops will be gar-
risoned in Hong Kong, but does not permit these forces to interfere
with the internal affairs of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (SAR) .70 The maintenance of public order shall be the re-
sponsibility of the Hong Kong SAR government. 71 The presence of
troops in Hong Kong may be justified in order to protect the territo-
rial integrity of the PRC. The question remains, however, whether
that sovereign right must yield to the self-determination principle.72
Finally, Britain has agreed to a Chinese proposal that a joint liai-
son group be formed to observe the transition process. The group will
meet alternately in Peking, London and Hong Kong before perma-
nently headquartering in Hong Kong in 1988. The group will have
no supervisory role, but will act only as a consulting body. It will
have no part in the administration of Hong Kong, but will serve as a
vehicle for the exchange of information on the implementation of the
agreement.73 The liaison group is crucial to the need of the PRC to
fully understand the intricacies of the Hong Kong economic system.
The actions of the liaison group will be closely followed by the peo-
ple of Hong Kong. Although Peking has asked that the group in-
clude local leaders,7 4 Hong Kong remains wary of any Chinese inter-
ference in its affairs.7 5 The value of the liaison group may be
measured by the impression the Chinese members make upon the
people of Hong Kong, rather than the information that the PRC can
extract during the transition period. Whether the region will remain
68. Id. at 21.
69. South China Morning Post, Aug. 2, 1984, at 8, col. 1.
70. Hong Kong White Paper, supra note 3, at 23.
71. Id.
72. See supra note 14; see also infra note 82.
73. Hong Kong White Paper, supra note at 13, 26-27.
74. South China Morning Post, July 25, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
75. Id. at 9, col. 1.
a major Pacific Basin financial center must ultimately be determined
by the people of Hong Kong. Given the freedom to determine their
political status and to pursue their economic, social, and cultural de-
velopment, they will more readily accept the challenge of this unique
proposal for coexistence. It is within this setting that the principle of
self-determination should be reviewed.
SELF-DETERMINATION AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Self-determination, like any other principle of international law,
derives its legitimacy from the degree of acceptance it receives from
the community of nations. Whether a state accepts a principle as a
norm of international law is largely dependent on the source to
which it may be attributed, and the extent to which that source re-
flects the national interest of the state.76 Nations recognize that ob-
servance of customary norms of international law is often in their
national interest. Principles of reciprocity and continuity in mutual
relations among states suggest that even if there is no international
authority to enforce the law, there is "horizontal enforcement" in the
reactions of other nations.77
A body of international law has been developed in the sense that
commonly accepted sources of international law have been identi-
fied. Article 38 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)78 provides
that the Court, in interpreting international law, shall apply interna-
tional conventions, international custom, the "general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations," and the judicial decisions and
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.79 A prerequisite to
the use of treaties and custom as methods of creating principles of
international law is agreement among states on the recognition of
certain rules as norms.80 There is a distinction between the binding
effect of treaties and that of customary law. Treaties are actually
only a source of obligation, derived from mutually binding promises,
rather than a source of law. Yet it is a general principle of law,
recognized by civilized nations, that the obligation be carried out, or
pacta sunt servanda.81 Continued adherence to an international con-
vention is evidence of a general practice accepted as law, or interna-
76. See generally, L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (1979), reprinted in L.
HENKIN, supra note 4, at 14-16.
77. Id. at 15.
78. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179, art. 38, para. l(a)-(d).
79. Id.
80. Tunkin, Coexistence and International Law, 3 RECUEIL DES COuRS 1, 21-23
(1958), reprinted in L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 70.
81. Fitzmaurice, Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International
Law, SYMBOLAE VERZIIL 153, 157-59 (1958), reprinted in L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at
69-70.
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tional custom, a source of law.82 When a custom satisfies the require-
ments of Article 38 of the ICJ, it constitutes a general rule of
international law that applies to every state, unless a state unam-
biguously and consistently objects to the recognition of the practice
as law.83
The UN is the institution best suited for the development of cus-
tom-based international law. The UN provides a forum for discus-
sion on any subject of concern to interested states; it may adopt prin-
ciples in formal declarations and resolutions; and it allows a state to
register formal objections.8 4
The pronouncements of the UN and the ICJ represent a consen-
sus, especially within the Third World, of the importance of the
principle of self-determination to world peace and stability. General
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960,5 the cornerstone of self-
determination, declares in part: "All peoples have the right to self-
82. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 36.
83. Waldock, General Course on International Law, 2 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 49-
53 (1962), reprinted in L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 66.
84. See generally U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-38.
85. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/
4684 (1960). The resolution declares:
I. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of
the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and
cooperation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should
never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against depen-
dent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely
their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory
shall be respected.
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories
or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all
powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations,
in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction
as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete indepen-
dence and freedom.
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and
the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations.
7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the pre-
sent Declaration on the basis of equality, noninterference in the internal affairs
of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territo-
rial integrity.
Id.
determination; by virtue of that right, they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."8 6
As Professor Michla Pomerance recounts, "[no] resolution in UN
history has been cited more frequently than Resolution 1514 (XV),
the Declaration on Colonialism. ' 87 One view of the effect of this
practice was expressed as follows: "[T]he cumulative impact of
many resolutions when similar in content, voted for by overwhelming
majorities and frequently repeated over a period of time . . .[is] a
general opinio juris. . .[constituting] a norm of customary interna-
tional law." 88 Resolution 1514 (XV) and the long list of resolutions
in its wake, which proclaim the principle of self-determination to be
an operative right in the decolonization of non-self-governing territo-
ries, constitute a general practice accepted as law. 89
A contrary view contends that self-determination was never an op-
erative principle of the UN Charter, but rather a desiderata of it.90
Other commentators deny that the principle has become a right, thus
minimizing the authority of the UN.91
The Declaration of Colonialism is consistent with the purposes and
principles of the UN Charter, which include the desire "[t]o develop
friendly relations among nations based on the respect for the princi-
ple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. '9 2 Chapters XI
and XII of the UN Charter emphasize the necessity of taking ac-
count the wishes of the people, with deference accorded to the par-
ticular circumstances of each territory and its peoples.93 The self-
determination principle implicitly regards the particular circum-
stances of each territory as a crucial element in applying the right.9 4
A second, less widely recognized resolution, adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly one day before the adoption of Resolution 1514 (XV),
identifies the methods by which a Non-Self-Governing Territory"
may exercise the right of self-determination. General Assembly Res-
olution 1514 (XV) 8 states that self-determination is accomplished
by: (1) emergence as a sovereign independent state; (2) free associa-
86. Id.
87. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at I.
88. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 4, 113 (advisory opinion) (separate opinion of J.
Dillard).
89. Id.
90. BIum, Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-Determination, 10 ISRAEL
L. R. 511 (1975) (emphasis in original) cited in M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 9.
91. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 4, 113 (advisory opinion) (separate opinion of J.
Dillard).
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2.
93. Id. at art. 73, para. b, art. 76, para. b.
94. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 10-11.
95. See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 73-74.
96. G.A. Res. 1541(XV), cited in M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 10.
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tion with an independent state; or (3) integration with an indepen-
dent state. Resolution 1514 (XV) further states that free association
and integration should be the result of informed and democratic
processes.97 A decision to associate with another state is always re-
versible.98 Integration, on the other hand, is permanent. It must,
therefore, be attained on the basis of complete equality. 99
The ICJ discussed the principle of self-determination in Western
Sahara.100 In reviewing Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), the
Court reiterated the need to take into account the wishes of the peo-
ple concerned. 1 1 More importantly, it cited Resolution 2625
(XXV), 1' 2 the Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations. 10 3 Resolution 2625
(XXV) expands the application of the self-determination principle
beyond the scope of Resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV). Recog-
nizing that the self-determination of peoples constitutes a significant
contribution to contemporary international law, and that its effective
application is of paramount importance for promoting friendly rela-
tions among states,0 the resolution proclaims that "the establish-
ment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or
integration with another State or the emergence into any other polit-
ical status freely determined by a people constitute modes of imple-
menting the right of self-determination by that people."'' 05 Thus, the
principle applies not only to Non-Self-Governing-Territories as de-
fined in the UN Charter, 108 but to all other territories which have
not yet attained independence.
Broad pronouncements such as these disguise the real difficulty in
applying the self-determination principle. Each claim of self-deter-
mination involves not only the reconciliation of conflicts with other
norms of international law, such as territorial integrity, non-interven-
tion, and sovereign equality, but also with competing claims for self-
97. Id. See also infra note 49 and accompanying text.
98. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 10.
99. Id.
100. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 4, 23 (advisory opinion).
101. Id. at para. 55, 57.
102. Id. at para. 58.
103. G.A. Res. 2625(XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) at 42, 28 U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970).
104. Id.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. U.N. CHARTER art. 73-74.
determination.1 0 7 Other political units within the same territorial
unit may feel that it is a more appropriate "self', or that its claim
has more validity because of sovereign rights.
The self-determination principle must be applied in light of the
special circumstances of each territory and its peoples.'10 The valid-
ity of the principle, however, is not affected by the fact that the Gen-
eral Assembly, in certain cases, did not consult the inhabitants of a
territory. 09 The ICJ explained that those "were based either on the
consideration that a certain population did not constitute a 'people'
entitled to self-determination or on the conviction that a consultation
was totally unnecessary in view of special circumstances."110 The ex-
ercise of self-determination may be set aside if its fulfillment would
cause tension and conflicts."'
Although the balancing of competing interests causes an inconsis-
tent application of the right of self-determination, it places the prin-
ciple more squarely in line with the basic nature of international law:
negotiation and compromise. Justification for support of the principle
may be found in the manner in which self-determination has become
a customary norm of international relations. The repeated expres-
sions of the need to focus on the freely expressed will of peoples in
the UN Charter and subsequent UN resolutions, together with pro-
nouncements of the ICJ, lend further credence to the acceptance of
the principle as law.
SELF-DETERMINATION IN PRACTICE
Determining the "Self'
The first step in the application of the principle of self-determina-
tion to a given territory is the determination of upon whom the right
is to be conferred. Much of the difficulty in the current use of the
principle is identifying the "self" which can claim the right to deter-
mine its political status."12 The right of self-determination is said to
belong to "all peoples";"x3 to "those who are still dependent" (in
Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories);"14 to "those subject to
alien subjugation, domination or exploitation;"" 5 and to the people
of "all other territories which have not yet attained indepen-
107. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 2-3.
108. Id. at 10-I1.
109. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 4, 19-20 (advisory opinion).
110. Id.
111. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 28.
112. Id. at 14.
113. G.A. Res. 1514(XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/
4684 (1960). See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) Annex at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
114. M. POMBRANCE, supra note 8, at 1.
115. Id.
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dence." 6 Generally speaking, the right belongs to all "colonial
peoples."11 7
In order to reconcile conflicting claims to "selfhood" the definition
of the self must be internationally determined." 8 The UN has
adopted a territorial rather than an ethnic criterion to define the
self.119 It has shown respect for the former colonial boundaries in a
region; the determination, however, is still made in light of the par-
ticular circumstances of a territory. 20
The right does not apply to peoples in a territory not under colo-
nial or alien domination.1 21 Resolution 1514 (XV) and other UN in-
struments condemn any attempt at the partial or total disruption of
the territorial integrity of a state.1 22 The 1977 Gros Espiell report 123
on self-determination states, however, that the guise of national
unity may not be used to conceal colonial and alien domination if it
does in fact exist, and that the right of the people concerned cannot
be ignored without international law being violated.1 24
The Third World believes that new political units emerging from
colonialism are entitled, ipso facto, to an "integral existence.' ' 128
General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV)1 26 declares that a colony
has a status separate and distinct from that of the state administer-
ing it and that such status "shall exist until the people of the colony
...have exercised their right to self-determination. 127 A cohesive
colony with an independent purpose, its own system of laws, and a
clearly defined territory would thus appear to be a prime candidate
for self-determination.
Although Hong Kong has been under British supervision and au-
thority, it has exhibited many of the characteristics of a sovereign
state. According to the customary international law, a sovereign
state has the following attributes: (1) a people, (2) a territory, (3) a
government, and (4) the capacity to enter into relations with other
116. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
117. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 14.
118. L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 211.
119. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 18.
120. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
121. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 15.
122. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
123. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 15.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 41.
126. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
127. Id. See also M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 44-45.
states.12 8
The people of Hong Kong of Chinese descent hold special British
citizenship. Under the provisions of the British Nationality Act of
1981, those born in Hong Kong possess British "dependent territo-
ries" citizenship. 129 This class of citizenship does not grant the "right
of abode" in the United Kingdom. 30 When the British government
pulls out of Hong Kong, the Chinese in the colony will lose their
British citizenship. 131 Arguably, the people of Hong Kong have a
unique status separate from any other group and may be considered
a somewhat homogenous population.
The boundaries of the colony have remained the same since the
lease of Hong Kong was granted to Great Britain in 1898.111 Not-
withstanding the claim by the PRC that Hong Kong is "an inaliena-
ble part of Chinese territory,"'133 the colony has a separate and dis-
tinct status' 3' that will continue after 1997 when Hong Kong will be
governed as a "special administrative region."'13
As mentioned above, the status of the Hong Kong government is
uncertain. 136 However, the colony presently has its own legal system,
including legislative and judicial branches. 37 These institutions can
serve in the capacity of a governing body, especially if a more repre-
sentative government is established.
Hong Kong has already exhibited a capacity to enter into interna-
tional relations. The colony is a contributing member of GATT
(General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade) and has negotiated its
own export quotas and tariff preferences. 138 Although Hong Kong
reflects the characteristics of a sovereign state, it is not entitled to
independence as a matter of international law. Its characteristics,
however, do support a compelling argument that the colony, as it
now exists, fits the proper definition of a "self" entitled to claim the
right of self-determination.
How the Right of Self-Determination is Given Effect
As evidenced by the title of Resolution 1514 (XV), the Declara-
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peo-
128. Jessop, The Conditions of Statehood, 3 U.N. SCOR (383d mtg.) at 9-12
(1948), cited in L. HENKIN, supra note 4, at 172.
129. Tso, supra note 2, at 133.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
133. Tso, supra note 2, at 132.
134. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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pies,13 9 there is a strong bias in UN practice towards independence
as the preferred mode of implementing self-determination.1 40 Al-
though it has been suggested that any decision to merge with an
existing state must follow independence and not be merely a substi-
tute for it,141 the ICJ in Western Sahara avoided reference to the
necessity of presenting the independence option to the integrating
territory.1 42 Integration into another state may come about without
the independence option being offered. Granting independence to a
non-viable political entity invites the perpetuation of the prior depen-
dent relationship or the substitution of a colonial situation with a
new neo-colonialist relationship. 43
Most commentators agree that Hong Kong cannot become self-
sufficient. 144 It is dependent upon the PRC for most of its food and
a third of its petroleum and water.145 These conditions, however,
should not prevent the right of self-determination to be exercised by
free association or integration. 146 Trade agreements with the PRC
could satisfy the need of the colony for resources and insure a sub-
stantial flow of capital to the PRC in return. In effect, the agreement
envisions this relationship by maintaining a capitalist enclave in the
PRC. The essence of self-determination, however, is in the method,
not the result.1 47 Integration or free association in accordance with
the principle must be accomplished by granting due regard to the
freely expressed will of the people of the territory concerned. 148
The role of the UN in promoting the principle of self-determina-
tion is limited by the provisions of its Charter. It is not authorized to
intervene in "matters which are essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any State. ' 149 By adopting Resolution 1514 (XV), how-
ever, it may be asserted, as a matter of international law, that if a
colonial situation exists it cannot be considered an essentially domes-
139. See supra note 82.
140. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 25.
141. Id.
142. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 4, 60 (advisory opinion).
143. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 17.
144. Telephone interview with Mr. Jack Hand, Hong Kong Commission, British
Embassy, New York (July 24, 1984).
145. Tso, supra note 2, at 116.
146. See supra note 82, para. 4.
147. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 24-25. See also Western Sahara, 1975
I.C.J. 4, 35 (advisory opinion).
148. See supra note 82.
149. Szasz, Role of the United Nations in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 345, 345 (1983) (Mr. Szasz is the Principal Officer of the Office of the United
Nations Legal Counsel.). See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
tic conflict. 150 The argument thus shifts to whether the conflict is
"colonial."
An otherwise domestic conflict may also be internationalized if it
creates conditions which extend past the borders of the state con-
cerned. A flow of refugees is the most common spillover effect of an
otherwise domestic conflict. 15 There is a strong possibility that this
will occur in Hong Kong. More important to the international eco-
nomic community is the issue of how the internal conflict in Hong
Kong will affect the extensive foreign investment in the colony. This
question itself could serve to internationalize the Hong Kong
problem.
Assuming that UN intervention in Hong Kong is appropriate, sev-
eral methods may be utilized to analyze the application of the self-
determination principle. The General Assembly may open discussion
by placing the matter on the agenda, it may establish an organ to
consider and report on a territory's claim, and it may seek an advi-
sory opinion from the ICJ.152 These actions are intended to present
relevant information to the General Assembly.
For example, the UN sought an advisory opinion of the ICJ to
provide information on the self-determination claim of certain areas
of the Western Sahara.15 3 In the Western Sahara case, the ICJ fo-
cused on whether there were sufficient "legal ties of such a nature as
might affect the application of 1514 (XV)... and in particular, of
the principle of self-discrimination."'1 54 An analysis of the "ties of
sovereignty"155 in the history of a colony has relevance in reconciling
conflicting claims. The ICJ, however, had more than ties of sover-
eignty in mind, although those are the most important. Legal ties,
such as economic, cultural, and social similarities, would further evi-
dence the desires of the inhabitants to determine whether to associ-
ate or integrate with another state.
In agreeing with the holding of the Court that sufficient legal ties
did not exist, Justice Boni, in a separate opinion, noted that:
If the General Assembly had had before it an advisory opinion of the Court
declaring that there were ties of sovereignty between Morocco and certain
areas of Western Sahara, it would have been obliged to consult the inhabi-
tants of the region on the different options provided for in resolution
1514(XV). 156
In another separate opinion, Justice Dillard diminished the impor-
150. Szasz, supra note 149, at 349-50.
151. Id. at 348.
152. Id. at 353.
153. See generally Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 4, 19-20 (advisory opinion).
154. Id. at para. 167.
155. Id.
156. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 4, 114 (advisory opinion) (separate opinion of J.
Dillard).
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tance of "legal ties," admitting that while "they may influence some
of the projected procedures for decolonization" they will have "only
a tangential effect on the ultimate choices available to the peo-
ple." 157 He further stated that "[ilt is for the people to determine
the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the
people."158
Once the UN has decided to act upon a self-determination claim,
a method must be prescribed by which the people concerned can
freely express their will. There are several methods, accepted in UN
practice, to ascertain the wishes of the people. First, a plebiscite may
be conducted under neutral auspices.1 59 This method is preferable
where integration or free association are considered. Free association
should be the result of a "free and voluntary choice ... expressed
through informed and democratic processes."160 Integration should
be on the basis of complete equality, 61 and a result of "the freely
expressed wishes of a territory's peoples acting with full knowledge
of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed
through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted
and based on universal adult suffrage."1 2 Plebiscites, however, are
not the only method by which to ascertain the will of the people.
The UN may rely upon the opinion of an expert commission or a
representative body of the territory.163 Often, the establishment of a
"national liberation movement" serves as a better method to deter-
mine the wishes of the people than a referendum.6 In Hong Kong,
the plebiscite option has been ruled out by the British authorities . 65
Great Britain has determined that the report of the assessment office
in Hong Kong will adequately represent the views of the people.166 If
the wishes of the people of Hong Kong are somehow to be deter-
mined, however, the right of self-determination requires that their




159. M. POMERANCE, supra note 8, at 4.
160. Id. at 10.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 10-11.
163. Id. at 4.
164. Id. at 35.
165. See supra note 142.
166. Id.
CONCLUSION
The transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong must be accomplished
within generally accepted principles of international law. The princi-
ple of self-determination has had a significant effect upon contempo-
rary international law and plays an important role in the mutual re-
lations of states. The doctrine does not require that every territory
claiming self-determination be granted independence. Each claim
must be addressed according to the particular circumstances of the
territory and its peoples.
The crucial question in the Hong Kong situation is not whether
the colony is entitled to independence, but rather whether Great
Britain and the PRC will pay due regard to the wishes of the people
in determining how to complete the transfer of sovereignty. The peo-
ple of Hong Kong may express a desire for free association with the
PRC or integration on the basis of equality.
Historically, the UN has intervened in other colonial situations to
promote and protect the right of peoples to choose the sovereignty
under which they shall live. The development of the Third World as
a major force in international affairs is directly attributable to the
UN placing paramount importance upon the self-determination prin-
ciple. Hong Kong is a classic colonial example. In contrast to lesser-
developed countries in the Third World, however, Hong Kong has
achieved prominent economic status in the Pacific Basin while under
colonial rule. Its people should be no less entitled to UN protection.
Discussions within the General Assembly regarding self-determina-
tion in Hong Kong should be called for before the treaty is formal-
ized next year.
ERIC M. AMBERG
